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Abstract. Infinite-state systems such as distributed protocols are challenging to
verify using interactive theorem provers or automatic verification tools. Of these
techniques, deductive verification is highly expressive but requires the user to
annotate the system with inductive invariants. To relieve the user from this labor-
intensive and challenging task, invariant inference aims to find inductive invari-
ants automatically. Unfortunately, when applied to infinite-state systems such as
distributed protocols, existing inference techniques often diverge, which limits
their applicability.
This paper proposes user-guided invariant inference based on phase invariants,
which capture the different logical phases of the protocol. Users conveys their
intuition by specifying a phase structure, an automaton with edges labeled by
program transitions; the tool automatically infers assertions that hold in the au-
tomaton’s states, resulting in a full safety proof. The additional structure from
phases guides the inference procedure towards finding an invariant.
Our results show that user guidance by phase structures facilitates successful in-
ference beyond the state of the art. We find that phase structures are pleasantly
well matched to the intuitive reasoning routinely used by domain experts to un-
derstand why distributed protocols are correct, so that providing a phase structure
reuses this existing intuition.
1 Introduction
Infinite-state systems such as distributed protocols remain challenging to verify despite
decades of work developing interactive and automated proof techniques. Such proofs
rely on the fundamental notion of an inductive invariant. Unfortunately, specifying in-
ductive invariants is difficult for users, who must often repeatedly iterate through candi-
date invariants before achieving an inductive invariant. For example, the Verdi project’s
proof of the Raft consensus protocol used an inductive invariant with 90 conjuncts and
relied on significant manual proof effort [60, 61].
The dream of invariant inference is that users would instead be assisted by auto-
matic procedures that could infer the required invariants. While other domains have
seen successful applications of invariant inference, using techniques such as abstract
interpretation [18] and property-directed reachability [10, 21], existing inference tech-
niques fall short for interesting distributed protocols, and often diverge while searching
for an invariant. These limitations have hindered adoption of invariant inference.
Our Approach. The idea of this paper is that invariant inference can be made dras-
tically more effective by utilizing user-guidance in the form of phase structures. We
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propose user-guided invariant inference, in which the user provides some additional in-
formation to guide the tool towards an invariant. An effective guidance method must
(1) match users’ high-level intuition of the proof, and (2) convey information in a way
that an automatic inference tool can readily utilize to direct the search. In this setting
invariant inference turns a partial, high-level argument accessible to the user into a full,
formal correctness proof, overcoming scenarios where procuring the proof completely
automatically is unsuccessful.
Our approach places phase invariants at the heart of both user interaction and algo-
rithmic inference. Phase invariants have an automaton-based form that is well-suited to
the domain of distributed protocols. They allow the user to convey a high-level tempo-
ral intuition of why the protocol is correct in the form of a phase structure. The phase
structure provides hints that direct the search and allow a more targeted generalization
of states to invariants, which can facilitate inference where it is otherwise impossible.
This paper makes the following contributions:
(1) We present phase invariants, an automaton-based form of safety proofs, based
on the distinct logical phases of a certain view of the system. Phase invariants closely
match the way domain experts already think about the correctness of distributed proto-
cols by state-machine refinement à la Lamport [e.g. 42].
(2) We describe an algorithm for inferring inductive phase invariants from phase
structures. The decomposition to phases through the phase structure guides inference
towards finding an invariant. The algorithm finds a proof over the phase structure or ex-
plains why no such proof exists. In this way, phase invariants facilitate user interaction
with the algorithm.
(3) Our algorithm reduces the problem of inferring inductive phase invariants from
phase structures to the problem of solving a linear system of Constrained Horn Clauses
(CHC), irrespective of the inference technique and the logic used. In the case of univer-
sally quantified phase inductive invariants for protocols modeled in EPR (motivated by
previous deductive approaches [50, 49, 59]), we show how to solve the resulting CHC
using a variant of PDR∀ [39].
(4) We apply this approach to the inference of invariants for several interesting
distributed protocols. (This is the first time invariant inference is applied to distributed
protocols modeled in EPR.) In the examples considered by our evaluation, transforming
our high-level intuition about the protocol into a phase structure was relatively straight-
forward. The phase structures allowed our algorithm to outperform in most cases an
implementation of PDR∀ that does not exploit such structure, facilitating invariant in-
ference on examples beyond the state of the art and attaining faster convergence.
It is surprising that invariant inference—operating in the realm of logical clauses
and implications—can so effectively benefit from guidance by phase structures, which
exhibit a much higher level of abstraction. While there remain significant challenges
to applying invariant inference on complex distributed protocols—notably, inference
of invariants with quantifier alternations, necessary, e.g. for Paxos [49]—our approach
demonstrates that the seemingly inherent intractability of sifting through a vast space
of candidate invariants can be mitigated by leveraging users’ high-level intuition.
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2 Preliminaries
In this section we provide background on modeling and verifying systems using first-
order logic. We assume familiarity with first-order logic. We use many-sorted first order
logic, but omit sorts here to simplify the presentation. Although in this paper we will
mostly deal with uninterpreted first-order logic, our definitions and results extend to
logics with a background theory.
Notation. FV(ϕ) denotes the set of free variables of ϕ. FΣ(V ) denotes the set of first-
order well-formed formulas ϕover vocabulary Σ with FV(ϕ) ⊆ V . We extend the
notation =⇒ to quantified formulas and write ∀V. ϕ =⇒ ψ to denote that the formula
∀V. ϕ→ ψ is valid. We sometimes use fa as a shorthand for f(a).
Transition systems. We represent transition systems symbolically, via formulas in first-
order logic. The definitions are standard. A vocabulary Σ consisting of constant, func-
tion, and relation symbols is used to represent states(each function and relation sym-
bol is associated with its arity). Post-states of transitions are represented by a copy of
Σ denoted Σ′ = {a′ | a ∈ Σ}(where the arity of each function and relation sym-
bol is inherited from Σ). A first-order transition system over vocabularyΣ is a tuple
TS = (Init,TR), where Init ∈ FΣ(∅) describes the initial states, and TR ∈ FΣˆ(∅) with
Σˆ = Σ unionmulti Σ′ describes the transition relation.The states of TS are first-order struc-
tures over Σ, denoted STRUCT[Σ]. Each state s ∈ STRUCT[Σ] is a pair s = (D, I)
where D is the domain and I is the interpretation function mapping each symbol in
Σ to its interpretation over D. We denote by STRUCT[Σ]|D the set of structures with
domain D. In this way, every closed formula over Σ represents the set of states (first-
order structures) that satisfy it. In particular, a state s is initial if s |= Init. A transition
of TS is a pair of states s1 = (D, I1), s2 = (D, I2) with a shared domain such that
(s1, s2) |= TR, where (s1, s2) is a shorthand for the structure s = (D, I) obtained by
defining I(a) = I1(a) if a ∈ Σ, and I(a) = I2(a) if a ∈ Σ′. s1 is also called the pre-
state and s2 the post-state. Traces are finite sequences of states σ1, σ2, . . . starting from
an initial state such that there is a transition between each pair of consecutive states.
The reachable states of TSare those that reside on traces starting from an initial state.
Safety. A safety property P is a formula in FΣ(∅). We say that TS is safe if all the
reachable states satisfy P , in which case we also say that P is an invariant of TS. A
prominent way to prove safety is via inductive invariants. An inductive invariant Inv is a
closed first-order formula overΣ such that the following requirements hold: (i) Init =⇒
Inv (initiation), and (ii) Init∧TR =⇒ Inv′ (consecution), where Inv′ is obtained from Inv
by replacing each symbol fromΣ with its primed counterpart.Initiation and consecution
ensure that all the reachable states satisfy Inv. If, in addition, Inv satisfies: (iii) Inv =⇒
P (safety), it follows that all the reachable states satisfy P , and TS is safe.
3 Running Example: Distributed Key-Value Store
We begin with a description of the running example we refer to throughout the paper.
The sharded key-value store with retransmissions (KV-R), adapted from IronFleet [32,
§5.2.1], is a distributed hash table where each node owns a subset of the keys, and keys
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1 type key
2 type value
3 type node
4 type sequnum
5
6 relation owner: node, key
7 relation table: node, key, value
8 relation transfer_msg: node, node,
9 key, value, seqnum
10 relation ack_msg: node, node, seqnum
11 relation seqnum_sent: node, seqnum
12 relation unacked: node, node,
13 key, value, seqnum
14 relation seqnum_recvd: node, node, seqnum
15
16 init ∀n1, n2, k. owner(n1,k)∧owner(n2,k)
17 → n1 = n2
18 init // all other relations are empty
19
20 action reshard(n_old:node, n_new:node,
21 k:key, value:sequnum)
22 require table(n_old, k, v)
23 ∧¬seqnum_sent(n_old, s)
24 seqnum_sent(n_old, s) := true
25 table(n_old, k, v) := false
26 owner(n_old, k) := false
27 transfer_msg(n_old, n_new, k, v, s) := true
28 unacked(n_old, n_new, k, v, s) := true
29
30 action drop_transfer_msg(src:node, dst:node,
31 k:key, v:value, s:seqnum)
32 require transfer_msg(src, dst, k, v, s)
33 transfer_msg(src, dst, k, v, s) := false
34
35 action retransmit(src:node, dst:node,
36 k:key, v:value, s:seqnum)
37 require unacked(src, dst, k, v, s)
38 transfer_msg(src, dst, k, v, s) := true
39 action recv_transfer_msg(src:node, n:node,
40 k:key, v:value, s:seqnum)
41 require transfer_msg(src, n, k, v, s)
42 ∧¬seqnum_recvd(n, src, s)
43 seqnum_recvd(n, src, s) := true
44 table(n, k, v) := true
45 owner(n, k) := true
46
47 action send_ack(src:node, n:node,
48 k:key, v:value, s:seqnum)
49 require transfer_msg(src, n, k, v, s)
50 ∧seqnum_recvd(n, src, s)
51 ack_msg(src, n, s) := true
52
53 action drop_ack_msg(src:node, dst:node,
54 k:key, s:seqnum)
55 require ack_msg(src, dst, s)
56 ack_msg(src, dst, s) := false
57
58 action recv_ack_msg(src:node, dst:node,
59 k:key, s:seqnum)
60 require ack_msg(src, dst, s)
61 unacked(src, dst, *, *, s) := false
62
63 action put(n:node, k:key, v:value)
64 require owner(n, k)
65 table(n, k, *) := false
66 table(n, k, v) := true
67
68 safety ∀k, n1, n2, v1, v2.
69 table(n1,k,v1) ∧
70 table(n2,k,v2) →
71 n1 = n2 ∧ v1 = v2
Fig. 1: Sharded key-value store with retransmissions (KV-R) in a first-order relational modeling.
can be dynamically transferred among nodes to balance load. The safety property en-
sures that each key is globally associated with one value, even in the presence of key
transfers. Messages might be dropped by the network, and the protocol uses retransmis-
sions and sequence numbers to maintain availability and safety.
Fig. 1 shows code modeling the protocol in a relational first-order language akin to
Ivy [44], which compiles to EPR transition systems. The state of nodes and the network
is modeled by global relations. Lines 1 to 4 declare uninterpreted sorts for keys, values,
clients, and sequence numbers. Lines 6 to 14 describe the state, consisting of: (i) local
state of clients pertaining to the table (which nodes are owners of which keys, and the
local shard of the table mapping keys to values); (ii) local state of clients pertaining to
sent and received messages (seqnum_sent, unacked, seqnum_recvd); and (iii) the state
of the network, comprised of two kinds of messages (transfer_msg, ack_msg). Each
message kind is modeled as a relation whose first two arguments indicate the source
and destination of the message, and the rest carry the message’s payload. For example,
ack_msg is a relation over two nodes and a sequence number, with the intended meaning
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that a tuple (c1, c2, s) is in ack_msg exactly when there is a message in the network from
c1 to c2 acknowledging a message with sequence number s.
The initial states are specified in lines 17 to 18. Transitions are specified by the ac-
tions declared in lines 20 to 66. Actions can fire nondeterministically at any time when
their precondition (require statements) holds. Hence, the transition relation comprises
of the disjunction of the transition relations induced by the actions. The state is mu-
tated by modifying the relations. For example, message sends are modeled by inserting
a tuple into the corresponding relation (e.g. line 27), while message receives are mod-
eled by requiring a tuple to be in the relation (e.g. line 32), and then removing it (e.g.
line 33). The updates in lines 61 and 65 remove a set of tuples matching the pattern.
KV-R protocol. Transferring keys between nodes begins by sending a transfer_msg
from the owner to a new node (line 20), which stores the key-value pair when it re-
ceives the message (line 39). Upon sending a transfer message the original node cedes
ownership (line 26) and does not send new transfer messages. Transfer messages may
be dropped (line 30). To ensure that the key-value pair is not lost, retransmissions are
performed (line 35) with the same sequence number until the target node acknowledges
(which occurs in line 47). Acknowledge messages themselves may be dropped (line 53).
Sequence numbers protect from delayed transfer messages, which might contain old
values (line 42).
KV-R safety property. Lines 68 to 71 specify the key safety property: at most one value
is associated with any key, anywhere in the network. Intuitively, the protocol satisfies
this because each key k is either currently (1) owned by a node, in which case this node
is unique, or (2) it is in the process of transferring between nodes, in which case the
careful use of sequence numbers ensures that the destination of the key is unique. As is
typical, it is not straightforward to translate this intuition into a full correctness proof.
In particular, it is necessary to relate all the different components of the state, including
clients’ local state and pending messages.
Invariant inference strives to automatically find an inductive invariant establishing
safety. This example is challenging for existing inference techniques (§6). This paper
proposes user-guided invariant inference based on phase-invariants to overcome this
challenge. The rest of the paper describes our approach, in which inference is provided
with the phase structure in Fig. 2, matching the high level intuitive explanation above.
The algorithm then automatically infers facts about each phase to obtain an inductive
invariant. §4 describes phase structures and inductive phase invariants, and §5 explains
how these are used in user-guided invariant inference.
4 Phase Structures and Invariants
Phase invariants describe the protocol as transitioning between different logical stages.
In this section we introduce phase structures and inductive phase invariantsand explain
their role in verifying safety properties. In §5 we explain how we use these in guiding
automatic invariant inference. For brevity, proofs are deferred to Appendix E.
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O[k] T[k]
reshard(*,*,k,*)
recv_transfer_msg(*,*,k,*,*)
drop_transfer_msg(*,*,k,*,*)
retransmit(*,*,k,*,*)
send_ack(*,*,k,*,*)
drop_ack_msg(*,*,k,*)
recv_ack_msg(*,*,k,*)
put(*,k,*)
drop_transfer_msg(*,*,k,*,*)
retransmit(*,*,k,*,*)
send_ack(*,*,k,*,*)
drop_ack_msg(*,*,k,*)
recv_ack_msg(*,*,k,*)
put(*,k,*)
72 phase O[k]:
73 invariant ∀n1, n2. owner(n1,k)∧owner(n2,k)→ n1 = n2
74 invariant ∀n, v. table(n,k,v)→owner(n,k)
75 invariant ∀src, dst, v, s. ¬(transfer_msg(src,dst,k,v,s)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst,src,s))
76 invariant ∀n1, n2, v1, v2. table(n1,k,v1)∧table(n2,k,v2)→ n1 = n2 ∧ v1 = v2
77 invariant ∀src, dst, v, s. ¬(unacked(src,dst,k,v,s)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst,src,s))
78
79 phase T[k]:
80 invariant ∀n. ¬owner(n,k)
81 invariant ∀n, v. table(n,k,v)→owner(n,k)
82 invariant ∀src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2. transfer_msg(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,src1,s1)
83 ∧transfer_msg(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 = dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
84 invariant ∀src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2.transfer_msg(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,dst1,s1)
85 ∧unacked(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 ∧ dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
86 invariant ∀src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2. unacked(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,src1,s1)
87 ∧unacked(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 = dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
Fig. 2: Phase structure for key-value store (top) and phase characterizations (bottom). The user
provides the phase structure, and inference automatically produces the phase characterizations,
forming a safe inductive phase automaton.
4.1 Phase Invariants
Definition 1 (Quantified Phase Automaton). A quantified phase automaton (phase
automaton for short) over Σ is a tuple A = (Q, ι,V, δ, ϕ) where:
– Q is a finite set of phases.
– ι ∈ Q is the initial phase.
– V is a set of variables, called the automaton’s quantifiers .
– δ : Q × Q → FΣˆ(V) is a function labeling every pair of phases by a transition
relation formula, such that FV(δ(q,p)) ⊆ V for every (q, p) ∈ Q×Q.
– ϕ : Q → FΣ(V) is a function labeling every phase by a phase characterization
formula, such that FV(ϕq) ⊆ V for every phase q ∈ Q.
Intuitively, V should be understood as free variables that are implicitly universally quan-
tified outside of the automaton’s scope. For each assignment to these variables, the
automaton represents the progress along the phases from the point of view of this as-
signment, and thus V is also called the view (or view quantifiers).
We refer to (Q, ι,V, δ), where ϕ is omitted, as the phase structure (or the automaton
structure) of A.
We refer by the edges of A toR = {(q, p) ∈ Q×Q | δ(q,p) 6≡ false}.
A trace ofA is a sequence of phases q0, . . . , qn such that q0 = ι and (qi, qi+1) ∈ R
for every 0 ≤ i < n.
We say that A is deterministic if for every (q, p1), (q, p2) ∈ R s.t. p1 6= p2, the
formula δ(q,p1) ∧ δ(q,p2) is unsatisfiable.
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Example 1 (Quantified Phase Automaton and Structure). Fig. 2 shows a phase automa-
ton for the running example, with the view of a single key k. It describes the protocol
as transitioning between two distinct (logical) phases of k: owned (O[k]) and trans-
ferring (T[k]). The edges are labeled by actions of the system. A wildcard * means
that the action is executed with an arbitrary argument. The two central actions are
(i) reshard, which transitions from O[k] to T[k], but cannot execute in T[k], and
(ii) recv_transfer_message, which does the opposite. The rest of the actions do
not cause a phase change and appear on a self loop in each phase. Actions related
to keys other than k are considered as self-loops, and omitted here for brevity. Intu-
itively, the automaton transitions between phases when the protocol executes an ac-
tion that matches the automaton’s edge between the phases. Some actions are disal-
lowed in certain phases, namely, do not label any outgoing edge from a phase, such
as recv_transfer_msg(k) in O[k]. Characterizations for each phase are depicted in
Fig. 2 (bottom). Without them, Fig. 2 represents a phase structure, which serves as the
input to our inference algorithm.
Remark 1. We remark that the choice of automaton aims to reflect the safety property
of interest. In our example, one might instead imagine taking the view of a single node
as it interacts with multiple keys, which might seem intuitive from the standpoint of im-
plementing the system. However, it is not appropriate for the proof of value uniqueness,
since keys pass in and out of the view of a single clientover their lifetime. The phase
automaton should not aim to capture the phase structure of the implementation but that
arising from the correctness intuition.
We now formally define phase invariants as phase automata that overapproximate
the behaviors of the original system.
Definition 2 (Language of Phase Automaton). Let A be a quantified phase automa-
ton over Σ, and σ = σ0, . . . , σn a finite sequence of states (first-order structures)in
STRUCT[Σ], all with domain D. Let v : V → D be a valuation of the automaton
quantifiers. We say that:
– σ, v |= A if there exists a trace of phases q0, . . . , qn such that (σi, σi+1), v |=
δ(qi,qi+1) for every 0 ≤ i < n (in particular, q0, . . . , qn is a trace of A)and σi, v |=
ϕqi for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n.
– σ |= A if σ, v |= A for every valuation v.
The language of A is L(A) = {σ | σ |= A}.
4.2 Phase Invariants
Definition 3 (Phase Invariant). A phase automatonA is a phase invariant for a transi-
tion system TS (both over Σ)if L(TS) ⊆ L(A), where L(TS) denotes the set of allfinite
traces of TS.
Trace inclusion ensures that a phase invariant A can be soundly used to verify safety
properties of TS.
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Example 2 (Phase Invariant). The phase automaton of Fig. 2 is a phase invariant for
the protocol: intuitively, whenever an execution of the protocol reaches a phase, its
characterizations hold. This fact may not be straightforward to establish. To this end we
develop the notion of inductive phase invariants.
4.3 Establishing Phase Invariants with Inductive Phase Invariants
To establish phase invariants, we use inductiveness:
Definition 4 (Inductive Phase Invariant). A is inductive w.r.t. TS = (Init,TR) ifthe
following conditions hold:
Initiation: Init =⇒ (∀V. ϕι) .
Inductiveness: for all (q, p) ∈ R, ∀V. (ϕq ∧ δ(q,p) =⇒ ϕ′p).
Edge Covering: for every q ∈ Q, ∀V.
(
ϕq ∧ TR =⇒
∨
(q,p)∈R δ(q,p)
)
.
Example 3 (Inductive Phase Invariant). The phase automaton in Fig. 2 is an induc-
tive phase invariant: the characterizations are such that in every possible phase, when
the protocol executes a valid action starting from a state satisfying the current phase
characterizations, there is an outgoing edge that matches this action (covering), and the
resulting program state satisfies the characterization of the target phase (inductiveness).
For example, the only disallowed transition in O[k] is recv_transfer_message,
which indeed cannot execute in O[k] according to the characterization in line 75. Fur-
ther, if, for example, a protocol’s transition from O[k] matches the labeling of the edge
to T[k] (i.e. a reshard action on k), the post-state necessarily satisfies the charac-
terizations of T[k]: for instance, the post-state satisfies the uniqueness of unreceived
transfer messages (line 82) because in the pre-state there are none (line 75).
Lemma 1. If A is inductive w.r.t. TS then it is a phase invariant for TS.
Remark 2. The careful reader may notice that the inductiveness requirement is stronger
than needed to ensure that the characterizations form a phase invariant. It could be
weakened to require for every q ∈ Q: ∀V. ϕq ∧ TR =⇒
∨
(q,p)∈R δ(q,p) ∧ ϕ′p. How-
ever, as we explain in §5, our notion of inductiveness is crucial for inferring inductive
phase automata, which is the goal of this paper. Furthermore, for deterministic phase
automata, the two requirements coincide.
Inductive invariants vs. inductive phase invariants. Inductive invariants and inductive
phase invariants are closely related: an inductive phase invariant induces a “standard”
inductive invariant, and vice versa:
Lemma 2. If A is inductive w.r.t. TS then ∀V. ∨q∈Q ϕq is an inductive invariant for
TS. Conversely, if Inv is an inductive invariant for TS, then the phase automatonAInv =
({q}, {q}, ∅, δ, ϕ), where δ(q,q) = TR and ϕq = Inv is an inductive phase automaton
w.r.t. TS.
In this sense, phase inductive invariants are as expressive as inductive invariants. How-
ever, as we show in this paper, their structure can be used by a user as an intuitive way
to guide an automatic invariant inference algorithm.
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Remark 3. It is straightforward to add more flexibility to a phase automaton by allowing
a set of initial states, Q0. In this case, for the automaton to over-approximate all the
reachable states of TS, it suffices that every initial state corresponds to some initial phase
of TS, possibly depending on the valuation of V . Therefore, the initiation constraint in
the definition of an inductive phase invariant for TS may be relaxed into:
Init =⇒
∀V. ∨
q0∈Q0
ϕq0
 .
4.4 Safe Inductive Phase Invariants
Next we show that an inductive phase invariant can be used to establish safety.
Definition 5 (Safe Phase Automaton). LetA be a phase automaton overΣ with quan-
tifiers V , and let ∀V. P be a safety property. Then A is safe w.r.t. ∀V. P if
∀V. (ϕq =⇒ P)
holds for every q ∈ Q.
Lemma 3. If A is inductive w.r.t. TS and safe w.r.t. ∀V. P then ∀V.P is an invariant
of TS.
5 Inference of Inductive Phase Invariants
In this section we turn to the inference of safe inductive phase invariants over a given
phase structure, which guides the searchfor invariant. This section defines the problem,
shows that it can be reduced to a set of Constrained Horn Clauses, discusses the aspects
by which a phase structure guides inference, and considers witnesses for the case that
no solution exists. Formally, the problem we target is:
Definition 6 (Inductive Phase Invariant Inference). Given a transition system TS =
(Init,TR), a phase structure S = (Q, ι,V, δ) and a safety property ∀V. P , all over Σ,
find a safe inductive phase invariant A for TS over the phase structure S, if one exists.
Example 4. Inference of an inductive phase invariant is provided with the phase struc-
ture in Fig. 2, which embodies an intuitive understanding of the different phases the
protocol undergoes (see Example 1). The algorithm automatically finds phase charac-
terizations forming a safe inductive phase invariant over the user-provided structure. We
note that inference is valuable even after a phase structure is provided: in the running
example, finding an inductive phase invariant is not easy; in particular, the characteri-
zations in Fig. 2 relate different parts of the state and involve multiple quantifiers.
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5.1 Reduction to Constrained Horn Clauses
We view each unknown phase characterization, ϕq , which we aim to infer for every
q ∈ Q, as a predicate Iq . The definition of a safe inductive phase invariant induces a set
of second-order Constrained Horn Clauses (CHC) over Iq:
Initiation. Init =⇒ (∀V. Iι) (1)
Inductiveness. For every (q, p) ∈ R : ∀V. (Iq ∧ δ(q,p) =⇒ I ′p) (2)
Edge Covering. For every q ∈ Q : ∀V.
(
Iq ∧ TR =⇒
∨
(q,p)∈R
δ(q,p)
)
(3)
Safety. For every q ∈ Q : ∀V. (Iq =⇒ P) (4)
where V denotes the quantifiers of A. The number of constraints is 1 + |R|+ 2|Q|.
All the constraints are linear, namely at most one unknown predicate appears at the
lefthand side of each implication.
Constraint (4) captures the original safety requirement, whereas (3) can be under-
stood as additional safety properties that are specified by the phase automaton (since no
unknown predicates appear in the righthand side of the implications).
A solution I to the CHC system associates each predicate Iq with a formula ψq over
Σ (with FV(ψq) ⊆ V) such that when ψq is substituted for Iq , all the constraints are
satisfied (i.e., the corresponding first-order formulas are valid). A solution to the system
induces a safe inductive phase automaton through characterizing each phase q by the
interpretation of Iq , and vice versa. Formally:
Lemma 4. Let A = (Q,R, ι,V, δ, ϕ) with ϕq = Iq . Then A is a safe inductive phase
invariant wrt. TS and ∀V. P if and only if I is a solution to the CHC system.
Therefore, to infer a safe inductive phase invariant over a given phase structure, we
need to solve the corresponding CHC system. In §6.1 we explain our approach for doing
so for the class of universally quantified phase characterizations. Note that the weaker
definition of inductiveness discussed in Remark 2 would prevent the reduction to CHC
as it would result in clauses that are not Horn clauses.
Completeness of inductive phase invariants. There are cases where a given phase struc-
ture induces a safe phase invariantA, but not an inductive one, making the CHC system
unsatisfiable. However, a strengthening into an inductive phase invariant can always be
used to prove that A is an invariant if (i) the language of invariants is unrestricted, and
(ii) the phase structure is deterministic, namely, does not cover the same transition in
two outgoing edges. Determinism of the automaton does not lose generality in the con-
text of safety verification since every inductive phase automaton can be converted to a
deterministic one; non-determinism is in fact unbeneficial as it mandates the same state
to be characterized by multiple phases (see also Remark 2). These topics are discussed
in detail in Appendix A.
Remark 4. Each phase is associated with a set of states that can reach it, where a state
σ can reach phase q if there is a sequence of program transitions that results in σ and
can lead to q according to the automaton’s transitions. This makes a phase structure
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different from a simple syntactical disjunctive template for inference, in which such
semantic meaning is unavailable.
Remark 5. When the safety property is of the form ∀V. Grd → ψ where Grd, ψ ∈
FΣ(V), we sometime seek an inductive phase invariant where Grd guards the entire
phase structure of the automaton. This may be represented by splitting the initial phase
into two: one whose characterization includes Grd, and another “dummy” initial phase
whose characterization is ¬Grd. The dummy initial phase has a single self loop labeled
TR, whereas the other maintains the actual phase structure. Moreover, Grd is added to
the characterization of all other phases.
5.2 Phase Structures as a Means to Guide Inference
The search space of invariants over a phase structure is in fact larger than that of stan-
dard inductive invariants, because each phase can be associated with different charac-
terizations. Sometimes the disjunctive structure of the phases (Lemma 2) uncovers a
significantly simpler invariant than exists in the syntactical class of standard inductive
invariants explored by the algorithm, but this is not always the case.3 Nonetheless, the
search for an invariant over the structure is guided, through the following aspects:
(1) Phase decomposition. Inference of an inductive phase invariant aims to find charac-
terizations that overapproximate the set of states reachable in each phase (Remark 4).
The distinction between phases is most beneficial when there is a considerable differ-
ence between the sets associated with different phases and their characterizations. For
instance, in the running example, all states without unreceived transfer messages are
associated with O[k], whereas all states in which such messages exist are associated
with T[k]—a distinction captured by the characterizations in lines 75 and 82 in Fig. 2.
Differences between phases would have two consequences. First, since each phase
corresponds to fewer states than all reachable states, generalization—the key ingredi-
ent in inference procedures—is more focused. The second consequence stems from the
fact that inductive characterizations of different phases are correlated. It is expected
that a certain property is more readily learnable in one phase, while related facts in
other phases are more complex. For instance, the characterization in line 75 in Fig. 2
is more straightforward than the one in line 82. Simpler facts in one phase can help
characterize an adjacent phase when the algorithm analyzes how that property evolves
along the edge. Thus utilizing the phase structure can improve the gradual construction
of overapproximations of the sets of states reachable in each phase.
(2) Disabled transitions. A phase automaton explicitly states which transitions of the
system are enabled in each phase, while the rest are disabled. Such impossible transi-
tions induce additional safety properties to be established by the inferred phase charac-
terizations. For example, the phase invariant in Fig. 2 forbids a recv_transfer_message(k)
in O[k], a fact that can trigger the inference of the characterization in line 75. These
additional safety properties direct the search for characterizations that are likely to be
important for the proof.
3 As an illustration, Appendix C includes an inductive invariant for the running example which
is comparable in complexity to the inductive phase invariant in Fig. 2.
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Fig. 3: The work-flow of user-guided invariant inference through phase structures. The
input to the tool is a (1) program, (2) safety property, and (3) phase structure. The
output is either (4) inductive phase characterizations over the given phase structure, or
(5) proof that universally quantified inductive phase characterizations do not exist, in
the form of an abstract trace.
(3) Phase-awareness. Finally, while a phase structure can be encoded in several ways
(such as ghost code), a key aspect of our approach is that the phase decomposition and
disabled transitions are explicitly encoded in the CHC system in §5.1, ensuring that they
guide the otherwise heuristic search.
In §6.2 we demonstrate the effects of aspects (1)–(3) on guidance.
6 Implementation and Evaluation
In this section we apply invariant inference guided by phase structures to distributed
protocols modeled in EPR, motivated by previous deductive approachesto safety of
distributed protocols [50, 49, 59]. The work-flow for our approach is illustrated in Fig. 3.
6.1 Phase-PDR∀ for Inferring Universally Quantified Characterizations
We now describe our procedure for solving the CHCs system of §5.1. It either (i) re-
turns universally quantified phase characterizations that induce a safe inductive phase
invariant, (ii) returns an abstract counterexample trace demonstrating that this is not
possible, or (iii) diverges.
EPR. Our procedure handles transition systems expressed using the extended Effectively
PRopositional fragment (EPR) of first order logic [51, 50], and infers universally quan-
tified phase characterizations. Satisfiability of (extended) EPR formulas is decidable,
enjoys the finite-model property, and supported by existing SMT solvers such as Z3 [45]
and first order logic provers such as iProver [40].
Phase-PDR∀. Our procedure is based on PDR∀ [39], a variant of PDR [10, 21] that
infers universally quantified inductive invariants. PDR computes a sequence of frames
F0, . . . ,Fn such that Fi overapproximates the set of states reachable in i steps. In our
case, each frame Fi is a mapping from a phase q to characterizations. The details of the
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algorithm are standard for PDR; we describe the gist of the procedure in Appendix D.
We only stress the following: Counterexamples to safety take into account the safety
property as well as disabled transitions. Search for predecessors is performed by going
backwards on automaton edges, blocking counterexamples from preceding phases to
prove an obligation in the current phase. Generalization is performed w.r.t. all incoming
edges. As in PDR∀, proof obligations are constructed via diagrams [12]; in our setting
these include the interpretation for the view quantifiers (see Appendix D for details).
Edge covering check in EPR. When the transition relation formula is in EPR and the
phase characterizations are universally quantified, the checks induced by Equations (1),
(2) and (4) translate to checking (un)satisfiability of EPR formulas, potentially causing
divergence of the solver. Equation (3) is trickier as checking implication between two
EPR transition relations falls outside of EPR. To use a decidable edge covering check,
we exploit the typical structure of transition relations in our setting, which is a disjunc-
tion between the transition relation of exported actions (the different actions in Fig. 1).
In the phase automaton we label an edge (q, p) by a set of exported actions, each action
a with a guard g(q,p)a which is an alternation-free formula (a Boolean combination of
universal and existential closed formulas). The edge covering check (Equation (3)) can
now be written
∀V.
(
Iq ∧ TRa =⇒
∨
(q,p)∈R
g(q,p)a
)
. (5)
The righthand side of the implication is alternation-free and thus the check falls into
the decidable EPR class. Such edge labeling is sufficiently expressive for the phase
structures ofall our examples. Alternatively, sound but incomplete bounded quantifier
instantiation [23] could be used, potentially allowing more complex decompositions of
TR.
Absence of Inductive Phase Characterizations. What happens when the user gets the
automaton wrong? One case is when there does not exist an inductive phase invari-
ant with universal phase characterizations over the given structure. When this occurs,
our tool can return an abstract counterexample trace—a sequence of program transi-
tions and transitions of the automaton (inspired by [39, 48])—which constitutes a proof
of that fact (see Appendix B). The counterexample trace can assist the user in debug-
ging the automaton or the program and modifying them. For instance, missing edges
occurred frequently when we wrote the automata of §6, and we used the generated
counterexample traces to correct them.
Another type of failure is when an inductive phase invariant exists but the automaton
does not direct the search well towards it. In this case the user may decide to terminate
the analysis and articulate a different intuition via a different phase structure. In standard
inference procedures, the only way to affect the search is by modifying the transition
system; instead, phase structures equip the user with an ability to guide the search.
6.2 Evaluation
We evaluate our approach for user-guided invariant inference based on phase structures
by comparing Phase-PDR∀ to standard PDR∀, its inductive invariant inference coun-
terpart. We implemented PDR∀ and Phase-PDR∀ in MYPYVY [2], a new system for
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Program PDR∀ Phase-PDR∀ #p #v #r |a|
Inductive Phase-Inductive
|f| #c #q #l |f| #c #q #l
Lock service
(single lock)
2.21 (00.03) 0.67 (0.01) 4 1 5 1 11 9 15 21 6 3–4 3–4 3–6
Lock service
(multiple locks)
2.73 (00.02) 1.06 (0.01) 4 1 5 2 11 9 24 21 6 4 3–4 4–6
Consensus 60.54 (2.95) 1355 (570)∗ 3 1 7 2 9 6 15 15 12 5–6 10–14 9–15
KV (basic) 1.79 (0.02) 1.59 (0.02) 2 1 3 3 5 7 27 19 5 4 9–10 8–9
Ring leader 152.44 (39.41) 2.53 (0.04) 2 2 4 3 6–7 6 11 16 5 1–2 0–1 1–4
KV-R 2070 (370)∗ 372.5 (35.9) 2 1 7 5 12–15 24 156 106 11–13 5–11 15–67 12–52
Cache coherence > 1 hour 90.1 (0.82) 10 1 11 2 n/a n/a n/a n/a 13 10–15 12–27 14–39
Table 1: Running times in seconds of PDR∀ and Phase-PDR∀, presented as the mean and
standard deviation (in parentheses) over 16 different Z3 random seeds. “∗” indicates that some
runs did not converge after 1 hour and were not included in the summary statistics. “> 1 hour”
means that no runs of the algorithm converged in 1 hour. #p refers to the number of phases and #v
to the number of view quantifiers in the phase structure. #r refers to the number of relations and
|a| to the maximal arity. The remaining columns describe the inductive invariant/phase invariant
obtained in inference. |f| is the maximal frame reached. #c, #q, #l are the mean number of clauses,
quantifiers (excluding view quantifiers) and literals per phase, ranging across the different phases.
invariant inference inspired by Ivy [44], over Z3 [45]. We studythe following effects of
guidance by phase structures:
1. Can Phase-PDR∀ converge to a proof when PDR∀ does not (in reasonable time)?
2. Is Phase-PDR∀ faster than PDR∀?
3. Which aspects of Phase-PDR∀ contribute to its performance benefits?
Protocols. We applied PDR∀ and Phase-PDR∀ to the most challenging examples admit-
ting universally-quantified invariants, which previous works verified using deductive
techniques. The protocols we analyzed are listed below and in Table 1. The full mod-
els appear in [1]. The KV-R protocol analyzed is taken from one of the two realistic
systems studied by the IronFleet paper [32] using deductive verification.
Phase structures. The phase structures we used appear in [1]. In all our examples, it
was straightforward to translate the existing high-level intuition of important and rele-
vant distinctions between phases in the protocol into the phase structures we report. For
example, it took us less than an hour to finalize an automaton for KV-R. We emphasize
that phase structures do not include phase characterizations; the user need not supply
them, nor has to understand the inference procedure. Our exposition of the phase struc-
tures below refers to an intuitive meaning of each phase, but this is not part of the phase
structure provided to the tool.
(1) Achieving Convergence Through Phases In this section we consider the effect of
phases on inference for examples on which standard PDR∀ does not converge in 1 hour.
Examples. Sharded key-value store with retransmissions (KV-R): see §3 and Example 1.
This protocol has not been modeled in decidable logic before.
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Cache coherence. This example implements the classic MESI protocol for main-
taining cache coherence in a shared-memory multiprocessor [35], modeled in decidable
logic for the first time. Cores perform reads and writes to memory, and caches snoop
on each other’s requests using a shared bus and maintain the invariant that there is at
most one writer of a particular cache line. For simplicity, we consider only a single
cache line, and yet the example is still challenging for PDR∀. Standard explanations
of this protocol in the literature already use automata to describe this invariant, and we
directly exploit this structure in our phase automaton. Phase structure: There are 10
phases in total, grouped into three parts corresponding to the modified, exclusive, and
shared states in the classical description. Within each group, there are additional phases
for when a request is being processed by the bus. For example, in the shared group,
there are phases for handling reads by cores without a copy of the cache line, writes by
such cores, and also writes by cores that do have a copy. Overall, the phase structure is
directly derived from textbook descriptions, taking into account that use of the shared
bus is not atomic.
Results and discussion. Measurements for these examples appear in Table 1. Stan-
dard PDR∀ fails to converge in less than an hour on 13 out of 16 seeds for KV-R and
all 16 seeds for the cachecoherence protocol. In contrast, Phase-PDR∀ converges to a
proof in a few minutes in all cases. These results demonstrate that phase structures can
effectively guide the search and obtain an invariant quickly where standard inductive
invariant inference does not.
(2) Enhancing Performance Through Phases In this section we consider the use of
phase structures to improve the speed of convergence to a proof.
Examples. Distributed lock service, adapted from [60], allows clients to acquire and
release locks by sending requests to a central server, which guarantees that only one
client holds each lock at a time. Phase structure: for each lock, the phases follow the
4 steps by which a client completes a cycle of acquire and release. We also consider a
simpler variant with only a single lock, reducing the arity of all relations and removing
the need for an automaton view. Its phase structure is the same, only for a single lock.
Simple quorum-based consensus, based on the example in [59]. In this protocol,
nodes propose themselves and then receive votes from other nodes. When a quorum
of votes for a node is obtained, it becomes the leader and decides on a value. Safety
requires that decided values are unique. The phase structure distinguishes between the
phases before any node is elected leader, once a node is elected, and when values are
decided. Note that the automaton structure is unquantified.
Leader election in a ring [13, 50], in which nodes are organized in a directional ring
topology with unique IDs, and the safety property is that an elected leader is a node
with the highest ID. Phase structure: for a view of two nodes n1, n2, in the first phase,
messages with the ID of n1 are yet to advance in the ring past n2, while in the second
phase, a message advertising n1 has advanced past n2. The inferred characterizations
include another quantifier on nodes, constraining interference (see §7).
Sharded key-value store (KV) is a simplified version of KV-R above, without mes-
sage drops and the retransmission mechanism. The phase structure is exactly as in
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KV-R, omitting transitions related to sequence numbers and acknowledgment. This pro-
tocol has not been modeled in decidable logic before.
Results and discussion. We compare the performance of standard PDR∀ and Phase-
PDR∀ on the above examples, with results shown in Table 1. For each example, we ran
the two algorithms on 16 different Z3 random seeds. Measurements were performed
on a 3.4GHz AMD Ryzen Threadripper 1950X with 16 physical cores, running Linux
4.15.0, using Z3 version 4.7.1. By disabling hyperthreading and frequency scaling and
pinning tasks to dedicated cores, variability across runs of a single seed was negligible.
In all but one example, Phase-PDR∀ improves performance, sometimes drastically;
for example, performance for leader election in a ring is improved by a factor of 60.
Phase-PDR∀ also improves the robustness of inference [26] on this example, as the
standard deviation falls from 39 in PDR∀ to 0.04 in Phase-PDR∀.
The only example in which a phase structure actually diminishes inference effec-
tiveness is simple consensus. We attribute this to an automaton structure that does not
capture the essence of the correctness argument very well, overlooking votes and quo-
rums. This demonstrates that a phase structure might guide the search towards coun-
terproductive directions if the user guidance is “misleading”. This suggests that better
resiliency of interactive inference framework could be achieved by combining phase-
based inference with standard inductive invariant-based reasoning. We are not aware of
a single “good” automaton for this example. The correctness argument of this example
is better captured by the conjunction of two automata (one for votes and one for accu-
mulating a quorum) with different views, but the problem of inferring phase invariants
for mutually-dependent automata is a subject for future work.
(3) Anatomy of the Benefit of Phases We now demonstrate that each of the beneficial
aspects of phases discussed in §5.2 is important for the benefits reported above.
Phase decomposition. Is there a benefit from a phase structure even without disabled
transitions? An example to a positive answer to this question is leader election in a ring,
which demonstrates a huge performance benefit even without disabled transitions.
Disabled transitions. Is there a substantial gain from exploiting disabled transitions?
We compare Phase-PDR∀ on the structure with disabled transitions and a structure ob-
tained by (artificially) adding self loops labeled with the originally impossible transi-
tions, on the example of lock service with multiple locks (§6.2), seeing that it demon-
strates a performance benefit using Phase-PDR∀ and showcases several disabled tran-
sitions in each phase. The result is that without disabled transitions, the mean running
time of Phase-PDR∀ on this example jumps from 2.73 seconds to 6.24 seconds. This
demonstrates the utility of the additional safety properties encompassed in disabled
transitions.
Phase-awareness. Is it important to treat phases explicitly in the inference algorithm,
as we do in Phase-PDR∀ (§6.1)? We compare our result on convergence of KV-R with
an alternative in which standard PDR∀is applied to an encoding of the phase decompo-
sition and disabled transition by ghost state: each phase is modeled by a relation over
possible view assignments, and the model is augmented with update code mimicking
phase changes; the additional safety properties derived from disabled transitions are
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provided; and the view and the appropriate modification of the safety property are in-
troduced. This translation expresses all information present in the phase structure, but
does not explicitly guide the inference algorithm to use this information. The result is
that with this ghost-based modeling the phase-oblivious PDR∀ does not converge in 1
hour on KV-R in any of the 16 runs, whereas it converges when Phase-PDR∀ explicitly
directs the search using the phase structure.
7 Related Work
Phases in distributed protocols. Distributed protocols are frequently described in infor-
mal descriptions as transitioning between different phases. Recently, PSync [19] used
the Heard-Of model [14], which describes protocols as operating in rounds, as a basis
for the implementation and verification of fault-tolerant distributed protocols. Types-
tates [e.g. 58, 24] also bear some similarity to the temporal aspect of phases. State ma-
chine refinement [3, 27] is used extensively in the design and verification of distributed
systems (see e.g. [46, 32]). The automaton structure of a phase invariant is also a form
of state machine; our focus is on inference of characterizations establishing this.
Interaction in verification. Interactive proof assistants such as Coq [8] and Isabelle/HOL [47]
interact with users to aid them as they attempt to prove candidate inductive invariants.
This differs from interaction through phase structures and counterexample traces. Ivy
uses interaction for invariant inference by interactive generalization from counterexam-
ples [50]. This approach is less automatic as it requires interaction for every clause of
the inductive invariant. In terminology from synthesis [29], the use of counterexamples
is synthesizer-driven interaction with the tool, while interaction via phase structures is
mainly user-driven. Abstract counterexample traces returned by the tool augment this
kind of interaction. As [37] has shown, interactive invariant inference, when considered
as a synthesis problem (see also [26, 54]) is related to inductive learning.
Template-based invariant inference. Many works employ syntactical templates for in-
variants, used to constrain the search [e.g. 16, 53, 56, 57, 7]. The different phases in a
phase structure induce a disjunctive form, but crucially each disjunct also has a distinct
semantic meaning, which inference overapproximates, as explained in §5.2.
Automata in safety verification. Safety verification through an automaton-like refine-
ment of the program’s control has been studied in a number of works. We focus on
related techniques for proof automation. The Automizer approach to the verification
of sequential programs [33, 34] is founded on the notion of a Floyd-Hoare automa-
ton, which is an unquantified inductive phase automaton; an extension to parallel pro-
grams [22] uses thread identifiers closed under the symmetry rule, which are related
to view quantifiers. Their focus is on the automatic, incremental construction of such
automata as a union of simpler automata, where each automaton is obtained from gen-
eralizing the proof/infeasibility of a single trace. In our approach the structure of the
automaton is provided by the user as a means of conveying their intuition of the proof,
while the annotations are computed automatically. A notable difference is that in Au-
tomizer, the generation of characterizations in an automaton constructed from a single
trace does not utilize the phase structure (beyond that of the trace), whereas in our ap-
proach the phase structure is central in generalization from states to characterizations.
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In trace partitioning [52, 43], abstract domains based on transition systems parti-
tioning the program’s control are introduced. The observation is that recording histor-
ical information forms a basis for case-splitting, as an alternative to fully-disjunctive
abstractions. This differs from our motivation of distinguishing between different pro-
tocol phases. The phase structure of the domain is determined by the analyser, and can
also be dynamic. In our work the phase structure is provided by the user as guidance. We
use a variant of PDR∀, rather than abstract interpretation [17], to compute universally
quantified phase characterizations.
Techniques such as predicate abstraction [28, 25] and existential abstraction [15],
as well as the safety part of predicate diagrams [11], use finite languages for the set
of possible characterizations and lack the notion of views, both essential for handling
unbounded numbers of processes and resources.
Finally, phase splitter predicates [55] share our motivation of simplifying invari-
ant inference by exposing the different phases the loop undergoes. Splitter predicates
correspond to inductive phase characterizations [55, Theorem 1], and are automatically
constructed according to program conditionals. In our approach, decomposition is per-
formed by the user using potentially non-inductive conditions, and the inductive phase
characterizations are computed by invariant inference. Successive loop splitting results
in a sequence of phases, whereas our approach utilizes arbitrary automaton structures.
Borralleras et al. [9] also refine the control-flow graph throughout the analysis by split-
ting on conditions, which here are discovered as preconditions for termination (the mo-
tivation is to expose termination proof goals to be established): in a sense, the phase
structure is grown from candidate characterizations implying termination. This differs
from our approach in which the phase structure is used to guide the inference of char-
acterizations.
Quantified invariant inference. We focus here on the works on quantifiers in automatic
verification most closely related to our work. In predicate abstraction, quantifiers can
be used internally as part of the definitions of predicates, and also externally through
predicates with free variables [25, 41]. Our work uses quantifiers both internally in
phases characterizations and externally in view quantifiers. The view is also related to
the bounded number of quantifiers used in view abstraction [6, 5]. In this work we
observe that it is useful to consider views of entities beyond processes or threads, such
as a single key in the store.
Quantifiers are often used to their full extent in verification conditions, namely
checking implication between two quantified formulas, but they are sometimes em-
ployed in weaker checks as part of thread-modular proofs [4, 38]. This amounts to
searching for invariants provable using specific instantiations of the quantifiers in the
verification conditions [30, 36]. In our verification conditions, the view quantifiers are
localized, in effect performing a single instantiation. This is essential for exploiting the
disjunctive structure under the quantifiers, allowing inference to consider a single au-
tomaton edge in each step, and reflecting an intuition of correctness. When necessary
to constrain interference, quantifiers in phase characterizations can be used to establish
necessary facts about interfering views. Finally, there exist algorithms other than PDR∀
for solving CHC by predicates with universal invariants [e.g. 31, 20].
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8 Conclusion
Invariant inference techniques aiming to verify intricate distributed protocols must ad-
just to the diverse correctness arguments on which protocols are based. In this paper
we have proposed to use phase structures as means of conveying users’ intuition of
the proof, to be used by an automatic inference tool as a basis for a full formal proof.
We found that inference guided by a phase structure can infer proofs for distributed
protocols that are beyond reach for state of the art inductive invariant inference meth-
ods, and can also improve the speed of convergence. The phase decomposition induced
by the automaton, the use of disabled transitions, and the explicit treatment of phases
in inference, all combine to direct the search for the invariant. We are encouraged by
our experience of specifying phase structures for different protocols. It would be inter-
esting to integrate the interaction via phase structures with other verification methods
and proof logics, as well as interaction schemes based on different, complementary,
concepts. Another important direction for future work is inference beyond universal
invariants, required for example for the proof of Paxos [49].
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A Completeness of Inductive Phase Invariants
There are cases where a phase automaton A is a phase invariant for TS, but this can-
not be established via an inductive phase invariant since there is no strengthening of
its phase characterizations that leads to an inductive phase invariant for TS. This may
happen for two reasons.
First, as with standard inductive invariants, it is possible that the strengthening nec-
essary to ensure inductiveness is not expressible in the logic available to us.
Second, even if we assume an unrestricted language of phase characterizations, it
is possible that the edge labeling is too permissive, thus adding transitions that are not
necessary for the edge covering requirement. Such “redundant” transitions may some-
times be harmless, but they may also violate preservation along some edge. Namely,
if no state that has such an outgoing transition can reach the corresponding phase q
from previous phases, such violations can be overcome by strengthening ϕq to exclude
all states that have such an outgoing transition (assuming an unrestricted language of
phase characterizations), thus disabling the problematic transition along the edge. In
these cases, an inductive automaton can be obtained. However, in other cases, strength-
ening the phase characterizations in this way would exclude states that can reach phase
q and as such would damage the inductiveness property along incoming edges of q. In
such cases, the only way to disable problematic transitions along automaton edges is by
strengthening the transition relation formulas (i.e., updating the automaton structure).
Hence, no inductive automaton exists for the given phase structure. The second reason
has no counterpart in standard inductive invariants; it reflects the additional structure
expressed by a phase automaton, which is enforced by our stronger definition of induc-
tiveness (as opposed to the weaker definition mentioned in Remark 2). Fortunately, this
reason can be avoided by considering deterministic phase automata:
Lemma 5. LetA be a deterministic phase automaton, and assume an unrestricted lan-
guage of phase characterizations. Then A is a phase invariant for TS if and only if it
has a strengthening A′ that is inductive w.r.t. TS.
Proof (Proof (sketch)). The implication from right to left is clear. Consider the other
direction. For a deterministic phase automaton,L(TS) ⊆ L(A) if and only if there exists
a simulation relation between TS and A. Furthermore, in this case, the inductiveness
requirement coincides with the requirement that the phase characterizations induce a
simulation relation. Hence, in this case, by defining the characterization of q to include
all the states simulated by it, we obtain an inductive strengthening of A.
Non-determinism is generally unbeneficial as it only mandates some states to be
characterized by multiple phases in the inductive phase invariant (see also Remark 2).
We point out that restricting our attention to deterministic phase automata does not lose
generality in the context of safety verification since every inductive phase invariant,
which are the ones we seek, can be translated into a deterministic one, as the following
lemma shows. Thus a structure admitting an inductive phase invariant can be converted
to a deterministic one with the same property.
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Lemma 6. Let A = (Q, ι,V, δ, ϕ) be an inductive phase invariant w.r.t. TS. Define an
arbitrary total order, <, on Q, and define A′ = (Q, ι,V, δ′, ϕ) where
δ′(q,p) = δ(q,p) ∧
∧
p′<p
¬δ(q,p′)
Then A′ is a deterministic inductive phase invariant w.r.t. TS.
We note that when the language of phase characterizations is restricted and an in-
ductive phase automaton does not exist for this reason, it may be possible to overcome
the limitations of the language and obtain one by changing the automaton structure.
B Abstract Counterexample Traces
Phase structures may not admit a safe inductive phase invariant. In this section we
discuss causes for this, and notions of concrete and abstract counterexample traces
constituting a proof that inductive phase characterizations cannot be found over the
given structure in the given language of candidate characterizations.
B.1 Concrete Counterexample Traces
We first consider the case where no safe inductive phase invariant exists, regardless of
the language of phase characterizations. Such a case may be witnessed by a counterex-
ample trace that exhibits a violation of one of the safety properties induced by S.
Definition 7 (Counterexample Trace). A trace σ1, . . . , σn of TS with a valuation v
for V is a counterexample trace for S, TS and ∀V. P if there exists a trace q0, . . . , qn
of S such that (σi, σi+1), v |= δ(qi,qi+1) for every 1 ≤ i < n, but one of the following
holds:
1. A state in the trace is not safe: σi, v 6|= P for some i.
2. A state in the trace allows a transition that is not covered by any outgoing edge:
There exists σ′ s.t. (σi, σ′) |= TR for some i, but no edge can cover this transition,
i.e. (σi, σ′), v 6|= δ(qi,q′) for all q′ ∈ Q.
Lemma 7. If a counterexample trace exists then there is no safe inductive phase invari-
ant with structure S, even if the language of phase characterizations is unrestricted.
In case 1, the trace violates the original safety property (enforced by Equation (4)).
This means that the transition system at hand is not safe and no safe inductive phase
invariant can be expected, for any phase structure (by Lemma 3).
In case 2, the trace violates the “additional” safety property specified by the phase
structure (Equation (3)). This does not indicate that the transition system is not safe,
but rather that the choices of the phase structure are intrinsically incorrect: it includes a
trace such that a corresponding trace of the transition system reaches a state that allows
a transition that is not covered by any outgoing edge in the automaton. If the phase
structure is nondeterministic, this may indicate that some of the edges are redundant
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and prevent obtaining phase inductive characterizations even if it is a phase invariant. If
the structure is deterministic (where every trace of TS corresponds to at most one trace
ofA), this means that the automaton excludes true traces of the transition system and is
therefore not a phase invariant, hence no corresponding inductive phase invariant exists.
In both cases, TS may be safe but the user has to modify the phase structure in order to
be able to verify it.
B.2 Abstract Counterexample Traces
In practice, phase characterizations are restricted since actual inference algorithms re-
strict their search space to a certain class of formulas. This may be viewed as a form
of abstraction, and may be one of the potential causes of absence of inductive phase in-
variant. In this case, we may obtain an abstract counterexample trace that may indicate
any of the violations discussed in Appendix B.1, but may also reflect the limitations of
the language of phase characterizations.
Language of Phase Characterization. We denote by L the class of formulas used to
represent phase characterizations. We denote by LΣ(V) the set of formulas in L over
vocabulary Σ with free variables from V . We assume an implication relation over L:
for every ψ1, ψ2 ∈ LΣ(V), a structure σ over Σ and a valuation v we have the rela-
tion σ, v |= ψ1 =⇒ σ, v |= ψ2. We use the implication relation to define a preorder
on structures (accompanied by valuations) that captures which structure satisfies more
formulas from LΣ(V):
Definition 8. For finite structures overΣ and valuation v for V , we define (σ1, v) vLΣ(V)
(σ2, v) if v is defined in both σ1 and σ2 and for all ψ ∈ LΣ(V), σ2, v |= ψ ⇒ σ1, v |=
ψ.
Intuitively, (σ1, v) vLΣ(V) (σ2, v) means that (σ2, v) is more abstract than (σ1, v): any
formula in LΣ(V) that is satisfied by (σ2, v) is also satisfied by (σ1, v). In particular, no
formula that is satisfied by (σ2, v) can distinguish it from (σ1, v). Note that vLΣ(V) is
defined for structures paired with the same valuation, which means that they interpret V
in the same way. We often omitΣ and V from the notation and write (σ1, v) vL (σ2, v).
Example 5 (Universal Characterizations). Consider L = ∀∗, i.e., the class of univer-
sally quantified formulas. In this case, (σ1, v) v∀∗ (σ2, v) if v is defined in both σ1, σ2
and σ1 is a substructure of σ2 (up to isomorphism). (The structure σ1 = (D1, I1) is
a substructure of the structure σ2 = (D2, I2) if D1 ⊆ D2 and I2 agrees with I1
on D1.That is, for every constant symbol c ∈ Σ, I2(c) = I1(c), for every func-
tion symbol f ∈ Σ with arity k, I2(f)(d1, . . . , dk) = I1(f)(d1, . . . , dk) for every
d1, . . . , dk ∈ D1, and for every relation symbol r ∈ Σ with arity k, I2(r)∩Dk1 = I1(r).
)
Abstract Traces. We view the preorder vL as an abstraction relation, and use it to
define a notion of an abstract trace, where each transition consists of an “abstraction
step” followed by a concrete transition of the system. An abstraction step transitions
to a “less abstract” state (that cannot be distinguished by any formula satisfied by the
source of the transition – the more abstract state).
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Definition 9 (Abstract Trace). Given a transition system TS = (Init,TR) over vo-
cabulary Σ, an abstract trace is a finite sequence of states σ1, . . . , σn over Σ with a
valuation v over V which is defined in all σi such that for every 1 ≤ i < n, there exists
σ˜i such that (σ˜i, v) vL (σi, v) and (σ˜i, σi+1) |= TR.
Note that since vL is reflexive, σ˜i may be equal to σi, in which case the abstract
trace is concrete.
An abstract counterexample trace is similar to a counterexample trace, except that
it consists of an abstract trace. While the violation exhibited by an abstract counterex-
ample trace may not be real, it indicates that no safe inductive phase invariant exists in
L.
Lemma 8. If an abstract counterexample trace exists then there is no safe inductive
phase invariant with structure S and phase characterizations in L.
Diagnosis of Abstract Counterexample Traces. When a user is presented with an ab-
stract counterexample trace, diagnosing the cause of the trace assists the user in under-
standing whether (i) the program is faulty, (ii) the phase structure needs to be modified
(and how), or (iii) the language of phase characterizations is not expressive enough to
capture the required characterizations. These cases can be differentiated by performing
bounded model checking along the given abstract counterexample trace. If a concrete
trace is found, it demonstrates whether the system is not safe or the automaton needs to
be changed. Otherwise, the counterexample is attributed to the limited logical language
used for candidate characterizations. In this case, the user can proceed by extending
the logical language, or modify the program and/or automaton so that they admit an
inductive phase invariant in the given logical language.
C Inductive Invariant for Sharded Key-Value Store
88 invariant ∀k, n1, n2, v1, v2. table(n1,k,v1)∧table(n2,k,v2)→ n1 = n2 ∧ v1 = v2
89
90 invariant ∀k, n1, n2. owner(n1,k)∧owner(n2,k)→ n1 = n2
91 invariant ∀k, n, v. table(n,k,v)→owner(n,k)
92
93 invariant ∀k, src, dst, v, s, n. ¬(transfer_msg(src,dst,k,v,s)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst,src,s)∧owner(n,k))
94 invariant ∀k, src, dst, v, s, n. ¬(unacked(src,dst,k,v,s)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst,src,s)∧owner(n,k))
95
96 invariant ∀k, src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2. transfer_msg(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,src1,s1)
97 ∧transfer_msg(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 = dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
98 invariant ∀k, src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2.transfer_msg(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,dst1,s1)
99 ∧unacked(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 ∧ dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
100 invariant ∀src1, src2, dst1, dst2, v1, v2, s1, s2. unacked(src1,dst1,k,v1,s1)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst1,src1,s1)
101 ∧unacked(src2,dst2,k,v2,s2)∧¬seqnum_recvd(dst2,src2,s2)→ src1 = src2 ∧ dst1 = dst2 ∧ v1 = v2 ∧ s1 = s2
Fig. 4: Inductive invariant for the running example.
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D Overview of Phase-PDR∀
Our procedure is based on PDR∀ [39], a variant of PDR [10, 21] that infers universally
quantified inductive invariants. PDR computes a sequence of frames, F0, . . . ,Fn such
that Fi overapproximates the set of states reachable in i steps. In our case, each frame
Fi is a mapping from a phase q to a characterization.
We describe the gist of the procedure using the terminology of phase automata. An
inductive trace is a sequence of frames such that ∀V. Fi(q) =⇒ Fi+1(q) for all i and
q ∈ Q, the first frame satisfies F0(ι) = Init where ι is the initial phase and F0(q) =
false for other phases (in accordance with Equation (1)), all frames satisfy Equations (3)
and (4), and the constraint of Equation (2) is interpreted between successive frames,
namely for all 0 ≤ i < n and for all (q, p) ∈ R,
∀V. (Fi(q) ∧ δ(q,p) =⇒ (Fi+1(q))′) . (6)
These properties ensure that Fi induces phase characterizations such that the language
of the induced phase automaton includes all traces of TS of length at most i.
The procedure gradually constructs the inductive trace by generating and blocking
proof obligations, where a proof obligation (m, q, i) consists of system state(s) m that
need to be proved unreachable at phase q of the automaton at frame i (i.e., with traces
of length bounded by i). When a proof obligation is shown to hold, it is generalized into
a new lemma that excludes the corresponding states and is added as a conjunct to the
characterization of phase q at frame i, where the phase characterizations of each frame
are initially set to true.4
Proof obligations are generated by a backward traversal. First, whenever a new
frame Fn is added, proof obligations are generated from counterexamples to the safety
properties of Equations (3) and (4) in some phase q′ based on Fn(q′). Then, to check
whether a proof obligation ψ at phase q′ can be blocked in frame Fi, our procedure
checks whether the phase characterizations of its pre-phases in the previous frame suf-
fice to show thatψ holds in q′ in accordance with constraint (2), i.e. ∀V. (Fi−1(q) ∧ δ(q,q′) =⇒ ψ′)
for all q such that (q, q′) ∈ R. Otherwise, there is a pre-phase q, a valuation v and a
transition (σ, σ′), v |= δ(q,q′) such that σ, v |= Fi−1(q) but σ′, v 6|= ψ. This generates a
proof obligation θ for phase q in frame i− 1.
In PDR∀, the proof obligation θ is constructed as the diagram of the counterexam-
ple, which is the strongest existentially quantified abstraction of σ [12]. In our case,
θ = Diag(σ, v,V) is defined by
Diag(σ, v,V) = ∃x1, . . . , xm. ψdistinct ∧ ψidentity ∧ ψrels (7)
where
– σ has domain {e1, . . . , em} and interpretation I.
– ψdistinct is a conjunction of all inequalities xi 6= xj for i 6= j.
– ψidentity is a conjunction of the equalities xi = c if c is a constant symbol and
I(c) = ei, and of the equalities xi = y if y ∈ V and v(y) = ei.
4 Our description here omits some details, such as pushing lemmas between frames; see [21] for
further discussion.
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– ψrels is a conjunction of atomic formulas r(xi1 , . . . , xia) for every relation symbol
r of arity a and elements e = ei1 , . . . , eia such that e ∈ I(r), and ¬r(xi1 , . . . , xia)
if e 6∈ I(r). Function symbols are treated similarly.
Note that Diag(σ, v,V) has V as free variables. A proof obligation (Diag(σ, v,V), q, i)
is blocked by adding to the characterization of phase q at frame i a universally quantified
clause (possibly with free variables in V) that implies ¬Diag(σ, v,V).
The procedure continues to generate (and block) proof obligations across automa-
ton edges, going backwards in the frames, until it reaches the initial frame. If a proof
obligation does not hold there, the procedure has found an abstract counter-trace, and
returns it as evidence of absence of a safe inductive phase invariant. The reason is that
the backward traversal is performed over diagrams, where (σ, v) |= Diag(σ˜, v,V) if
and only if σ˜ is a substructure of σ (up to isomorphism) [12], and hence if and only if
(σ˜, v) v∀∗ (σ, v) (Example 5). Otherwise, the procedure terminates if one of the frames
constitutes a solution to the CHC system, namely an inductive phase invariant.
E Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Given a domain D and a valuation v, the phase characterizations of
A induce the following simulation relation from TS to A: H = {(σ, q) |σ, v |= ϕq} in
the sense that:
1. (Labeling) (σ, q) ∈ H implies σ, v |= ϕq .
2. (Initial) For every σ0 |= Init, (σ0, ι) ∈ H . This follows from the initiation property
of A (Definition 4).
3. (Step) For every transition (σ, σ′) |= TR, if (σ, q) ∈ H then there exists p ∈ Q
such that (σ′, p) ∈ H and (σ, σ′), v |= δ(q,p). This holds due to the edge covering
and inductiveness properties of A (Definition 4): From edge covering, there exists
p ∈ Q such that (σ, σ′), v |= δ(q,p). From inductiveness, necessarily σ′, v |= ϕ′p.
Thus (σ′, p) ∈ H , as required.
Hence, for every D, v, trace inclusion follows. uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 2. Inductive phase invariant to inductive invariant: Init =⇒ InvA fol-
lows from the initiation condition ofA. For consecution, assume σ |= InvA and (σ, σ′) |=
TR. Then there is some q ∈ Q such that σ |= ϕq . From edge covering condition of A,
there exists p ∈ Q such that (σ, σ′) |= δ(q,p). From the inductiveness condition of A
necessarily σ′ |= ϕ′p, and thus σ′ |= Inv′A, as required. The converse direction is clear.
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 3. Consider the inductive invariant I = ∀V. ∨q∈Q ϕq per Lemma 2.
The safety of A (Definition 5) implies that I =⇒ ∀V.P , and the claim follows.
It is also possible to prove the lemma through phase invariants, by claiming that if
A is safe and an invariant for TS then TS is safe: Let σ1, . . . , σn be a finite trace of TS.
Let v be a valuation for V . σ |= A, so there exists a trace of phases q0, . . . , qn such
that σi, v |= ϕqi . Since v |= ϕqi → P , for every i it holds that σi, v |= P . The claim
follows. uunionsq
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Proof of Lemma 4. Assume that I is a solution to the CHC system. Then A is a safe
inductive phase invariant for TS: A satisfies initiation due to constraint 1, satisfies in-
ductiveness due to constraint 2, and edge covering due to constraint 3, and thus A is
inductive w.r.t. TS (Definition 4). Finally, A is safe (Definition 5) due to constraint 4.
Conversely, assume that A is an inductive phase invariant. Then constraint 1 is sat-
isfied because A satisfies initiation, constraint 2 is satisfied because A satisfies induc-
tiveness, and constraint 3 because A satisfies edge covering—all from the definition of
an inductive phase invariant (Definition 4). Finally, constraint 4 is satisfied because A
is safe (Definition 5). uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 5. The implication from right to left is a consequence of Lemma 1.
Consider the other direction. We construct an inductive phase invariant as follows:
For a given valuation v, characterize each phase by the set of states that can reach
this phase: reachability of σ to phase q means that there exist trace of program states
σ0, . . . , σn = σ and a matching trace of phases q0, . . . , qn = q per Definition 2.
The result is indeed an inductive phase invariant: initiation follows from A being a
phase invariant. Inductiveness follows from taking the characterizations to be sets of
reachable states (recall that the language of characterizations is assumed to be unre-
stricted). It remains to argue that edge covering holds. Let σ be reachable in phase q
and (σ, σ′) |= TR. Thus there is a sequence of states program states σ0, . . . , σn = σ
and a matching trace of phases q0, . . . , qn = q. Now, σ′ is also reachable, and since A
is a phase invariant there exists a trace of phases trace of phases q′0, . . . , q
′
n, q
′
n+1 = q
′
matching σ0, . . . , σn, σ′. But A is deterministic, so necessarily q′n = qn (by induction
over n) which is q. In particular this gives (σ, σ′) |= δ(q,p) where p = q′n+1, as required.
uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 6. The definition of δ′ ensures that it is deterministic, and inherits the
edge covering property from δ. Initiation is not affected by the edge labeling, and in-
ductiveness cannot be damaged by strengthening δ′(q,p). uunionsq
Proof of Lemma 7. Follows from Lemma 8 with the identity preorder (or simply by
reiterating the proof while ignoring abstraction steps).
Proof of Lemma 8. For the sake of the proof, we explicitly split each transition in an ab-
stract trace to an abstraction step followed by a transition. Let (σ1, σ˜1, . . . , σn, σ˜n), v)
be such a trace and q1, . . . , qn be as in the definition. LetA′ be a strengthening ofAwith
phase characterization ϕ′. Assume thatA′ is safe and show thatA′ is not inductive. As-
sume for the sake of contradiction that it is. We claim by induction on i that σi, v |= ϕ′qi .
The base claim follows from initiation. For the induction step, assume that σi, v |= ϕ′qi .
Since (σ˜i, v) vL (σi, v) and ϕ′qi ∈ L, σ˜i, v |= ϕ′qi . Now (σ˜i, σi+1), v |= δ(qi,qi+1), and
from the assumption that A′ is inductive necessarily σi+1, v |= ϕ′qi+1 , as required.
Let us consider the cause of the abstract counterexample trace. In case 1, σi, v 6|= P
is a contradiction to the safety ofA′ (Definition 5). In case 2, if (σi, σ′) |= TR, since we
have shown σi, v |= ϕ′qi it must follow from edge covering that (σi, σ′), v |= δ(qi,q′)
for some q′ ∈ Q, which is a contradiction. The claim follows. uunionsq
